Sunday, 17 January 2021

The Fate of C Coy, 6th Camerionians: Alpon, 9th March 1945

 

The Action of C Company, 6th Bn The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 9 March 1945

 Concurrent with my visit to the route that Peter White took during the 4th KOSB assault on Haus Loo, I visited the site of the 'last stand' of another Unit during the same battle. 156th Infantry Brigade, 52nd (Lowland) Division had been tasked with taking the town of Alpon. Its Units were: 4th/5th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, 6th Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) and the 7th Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles). C Coy, 6th Cameronians had been tasked with cutting off the German retreat during 4/5th Royal Scots Fusiliers and 7th Cameronians assault on Alpon. However, attacking forces lost contact with this sub-unit and it was subsequently overrun on the morning of Peter White's own battle. The site of their action was a little over half a mile from Haus Loo, although C Coy had been overrun and made prisoner much earlier in the day than the 4th KOSB came on their objective.

Wrecked German gun provides good firing point, Battle for Alpon, March 1945 (IWM B 15543)


Here is an account taken from the Regimental history:

At about 5.30 p.m. the 6th Cameronians commenced their wide turning movement to the North. The difficulties experience by the 4/5th RSF resulted in the two leading Coys (A and B) of the Cameronians becoming involved in the fighting on the Northern outskirts of the town and they were unable to break out into the open country. This necessitated an alteration of the plan, and D Coy was sent on a wider turning movement to seize some ground just to the West of the railway embankment. Covered by the approaching darkness the Coy, succeeded in this without difficulty. A Coy, was then sent forward, in the dark, to pass through Coy and take up a position on the railway. On approaching the embankment the Coy came under heavy fire and eventually took up a position just North of D Coy.

During the night B Coy, pushed forward and shortly before dawn two Platoons entered the factory area East of the Railway on the North side of the road. As visibility increased these two Platoons were subjected to very heavy fire from Germans located in the buildings. They succeeded in maintaining their positions throughout the 9th March but were unable to advance further or clear the area of enemy.

Meanwhile C Coy, worked their way across the Railway and advancing North of the Factory, reached their objective astride the main road to the East of the Factory well before dawn. Here they dug in, and through the remain house of darkness Their forward Artillery Observation Officer was engaging targets in the area.

Plan of attack, 1945 - 2020.

All went well with C Coy, until about 7 a.m. when enemy armour was heard moving in the vicinity. The Coy Commander asked for tank and anti-tank gun support, but the situation in Alpon made it impossible to move any vehicles East of the railway.

At about 7.30 a.m. the Coy was engaged by heavy small arms fire, and heavily shelled. The enemy also brought up two self-propelled guns and fired into the position at a range of 250 yards – just beyond the limits of the Coy PIAT guns, which were their only defence against armour.

Many men were killed and wounded, and the survivors were unable to offer any effective resistance against this devastating fire. They fought on, however, as best they could, until overwhelmed by and Infantry counter-attack from the South side of the road. Major J.S. Holland (the Company Commander) and the survivors were captured and immediately escorted across the Rhine.

When the position was eventually occupied by British troops on the morning of the 10th March the measure of the Company’s ordeal could be judged. The dead were still in their slit trenches and the ground was honeycombed with shell holes. Lt K.C. Clancey, one of the Platoon Commanders, was still alive, but so badly wounded that he died a few hours later. This young Officer was a model of what a Platoon Commander should be. He had shown throughout the campaign brilliant qualities of leadership and courage, and his patrol exploits during the winter months had been almost legendary. He was one of three brothers, all of whom gave their lives for their country in World War II. 

The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), Vol III, 1933-1946, by Brigadier C.N. Barclay, C.B.E., D.S.O. pp.209-10.

British advance through Alpon, March 1945 (IWM B 15542)


The late Brigadier Denis Whitaker obtained a first hand account of this action by the C Coy Comd, Maj Jack Holland. Interestingly, it may have been the case that the Cameronian company, shortly before it was overrun, fired upon a vehicle containing German staff officers reporting on the state of the German position on the west bank of the Rhine.

“It was during that period [of lost comms with Bn HQ] that I saw a German staff car coming up the road, obviously not realizing we were there. It was an irresistible target and our Bren guns opened up. The car stopped right in front of us and because the road was high up, I could see the space between the road and the bottom of the car, and I saw this figure dive out on the other side. I fired but he got away.”

“Then more paratroopers came down the road. By 10 o’clock in the morning, I was looking down the barrel of a Schmeisser.” Twenty seven men had been killed and wounded in the action. The remaining 60 were captured.

It was some time later…that Jack Holland had a glimmer as to the identity of the officers in that staff car.

Holland believes that these were the observers Hitler had sent to the front line to get that clear picture. He reckons these officers misunderstood an attack by one company isolated behind the lines, thinking they represented a major force. He knows from German interrogations that the officers ultimately reported to Hitler that Alpon had been taken and that the Wesel bridges were about to be overrun.

Rhineland: The Battle to End the War’ by Brigadier Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Stoddart, 1989, pp. 277-78.

Another short account was recorded in the Battalion history:



History of 6th (Lanarkshire) Battalion, The Cameronians (S.R.), John Cossar, 1945, pp.83-84.

Photos taken 2003


Photo 21: Looking directly onto the position with Haus Loo behind me. The photo, in common with the maps from 1945, shows the lane with a bend to the right, before joining the main Alpon road. Aerial imagery obtained recently appears to show that this lane is now straight.

Photo 22: Looking at the former C Coy position, from the bend in the land. From descriptions, the German assault came from this direction.

Photo 23: From same position as previous photo. Noting the description by Maj Holland of the raised roadway: "[t]he car stopped right in front of us and because the road was high up, I could see the space between the road and the bottom of the car..."

Photo 24: Looking NE, with C Coy position centre left, between pathway and mid-field trees.


Searching prisoners taken at Alpen, March 1945 - note distinct 52nd (Lowland) Division smock (IWM B 15541)


German prisoners taken at Alpon, March 1945 (IWM B 15539)

War Dead

Details of fatalities taken from Commonwealth War Graves Commission. All interred in the nearby Reichswald Forest War Cemetery.




Tuesday, 12 January 2021

Op VERITABLE: Attack on 'Kasteel Blijenbeek, February 1945

 Introduction

Peter White and his Platoon in B Company of the 4th Bn Kings Own Scottish Borderers took part in the fighting in the Rhineland, from late February to early March. His first action, at the historic Dutch castle Kasteel Blijenbeek, was covered in the chapters Operation ‘Veritable’, Halted in Broederbosch and Contact Lost.

 The passage on his Platoon’s advance through the woods on the morning of the (unsuccessful) attack on 18 February remains the best description of war I have yet to read:

Hearts pounding and tummies aflutter we commenced advancing towards the rim of the wood and the waiting enemy, fixing bayonets as we went, cocking the weapons and pushing off the safety catches. Our armour, revving heavily in the thick sand and accompanied by the Observation Officer's artillery Weasel, was moving beside and ahead of us. As the fascine-carrying tanks lurched clear of the trees and into enemy view, the roar of their engines was overshadowed by a series of ear-splitting crashes from either two or three 88mm German anti-tank guns. As tongues of flame and darkly coiling smoke licked and billowed up from the stricken leading tanks, those high-velocity solid shots that had missed, scythed back with hideous crashing echoes deep in the woods to our rear, toppling and smashing the trees in their paths. At the same moment, to complete the dismal prospect the Germans opened up heavily with cascading mortars and field artillery on the forward rim of the woods through which we were crouching and dashing forward from cover to thinning cover towards what was beginning to look like a singularly unsavoury form of mass suicide. I could already feel my clothes were wet with my sweating, tense exertions and the empty feeling at the pit of one's stomach, which had seemed so insistent at the start line, was becoming freed by the excitement despite the prospect. The seemingly inevitable shambles that all battles appear to be had commenced. pp.169-170.

The book’s chapters on the attack on the castle and the period dug in, in Broederbosch Wood, is rich in such description. He provides a number of place names and there are contemporary resources – period aerial photos, that can broadly locate Peter White’s movements. However, it is not possible to exactly place him, so I have read the passages and used my visit in March 2003, to walk the ground and try and put myself in his position. What follows are photos of my visit (18 years later I wonder why I took so few) with my attempt to relate them to the passages in the book. Please note that Broederbosch Wood and Afferden Wood, the plantation around Kasteel Blijenbeek - are used interchangeably, they are the same feature.

North West Europe


Overview of attack by 52nd (Lowland) Division, 8 Feb 1945, between Goch and River Maas.

Overview: The Rhineland Offensive, February-March 1945

Operation VERITABLE (Battle of the Reichswald), commencing on 8 Feb 1945, was the northern part of an Allied pincer movement whose purpose was to close with the Rhine, in preparation for the final invasion across the River Rhine. The Operation was meant to be a short, armoured thrust across frozen ground through light German opposition. However, freezing weather broke at the end of January 1945 and the resulting thaw resulted in significant flooding and muddy conditions. The Germans used these conditions to their advantage, deliberately flooding low laying land and slowed Allied armour as it struggled in the mud. Further, German sabotage of the southern dams on the River Roer delayed the American part of the pincer, Operation GRENADE, until 25 February, permitted the Wehrmacht to direct all defence to the north.  What was meant to be a short offensive, lasted over a month, until the final German withdrawal east of the River Rhine on 11 March 1945.

The operation was conducted by the Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group (Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery) and primarily consisted of the First Canadian Army under Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar and the reinforced British XXX Corps under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks.

By the end of the second week of the offensive, the 52nd (Lowland) Division joined in the attack. Its role was to roll up the German left flank, resting to the west against the River Maas. Terrain consisted largely of rolling countryside, low hills and many wooded plantations. Flooding was used to create tactical defensive barriers to mitigate against the Allied advantage in armour. 


The publication ‘Mountain and Flood: The History Of The 52nd (Lowland) Division, 1939-1946’ relates:

Kasteel Blijenbeek was a medieval castle in Holland, 4,000 yards from German Frontier. The walls of this castle were very thick and solid; 25-pounder and 5.5-in. shells made no impression. It was eventually dealt with by Spitfires with 1,000-lb. bombs. At the time of the attack by 155 Inf Bde. and 34 Armd Bde on Feb. 18, the River Maas was in full flood and the low-lying ground to the left of the anti-tank ditches was flooded or sodden. Enemy Self-propelled. guns covered by the bank of the main anti-tank ditch were able to move up and down the length of it and pickoff our immobilised tanks at short range.

This clearing of the extreme flank on the Maas was an operation of great importance in relation to the general advance on the broad front that stretched away to the Rhine, but it was not immediately decisive. For some days, the Germans held the Division on the line of the anti-tank ditch with intense and accurate gun- and mortar-fire and with an almost admirably stubborn refusal to move from the Kasteel. The Reconnaissance Regiment was continually in bitter action with German remnants in the spinneys about the hamlet of Rempeld on the south-western fringe of the wood. The 6th Bn., the Highland Light Infantry, ran into plenty of trouble in an approach to Groote Horst, a hamlet along the road to the east. One direct attempt to knock out the Kasteel by infantry assault caused heavy casualties among two platoons of the 5th Bn, Highland Light Infantry, for although it was held by probably no more than Is parachute troops, they were so determined, their machine guns so accurately trained on the few possible approaches to and through the thick walls of the ancient keep, that the enterprise was almost certain death for attackers on foot, who must either use a cause-way across the moat or an assault boat. The Germans are believed to have provisioned and reinforced their small garrison in the Kasteel by floating planks across the anti-tank ditch in the hours of darkness. These isolated paratroopers even advised the attacking platoons, in English, to surrender in a hopeless attempt. As a delaying action, the holding of the Kasteel was a German success. None of the Lowlanders cherish the memory of their expensive and abortive attempts to break down the strongpoint by direct assault.

Afferden Area, from 'Mountain and Flood'

When, on February 18, the 4th Bn, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, supported by the Churchill tanks of the 34th Armoured Brigade made across the 700 yards or so of broken ground between Afferden Wood and the Kasteel, it was to be met by such a murderous fire from the higher ground behind the keep, and to lose so many tanks, that the attack was called off. An attempt by one company of this battalion to rush Kasteel Blijenbeek was another costly, if gallant, failure. The strongpoint was not silenced until a dashing attack by dive-bombing Typhoons of the 84 RAF Group (cheered by every man of the 52nd Division) dropped nine 500 lb. bombs upon it. We need not grudge the Germans our meed of admiration for their pluck and toughness, even if we know now that the desperation was that of suicide on the national scale. They had been beaten in fair fight. They might stick to the Kasteel for legitimate purposes of delay, but their left had been decisively unhinged by the attack of the Lowlanders down the axis, Gennep-Afferden. The rocket-firing Typhoons had some vicious play with the Kasteel, and there was actually a plan to stage another full-dress divisional attack on the enemy positions here-abouts. Events elsewhere made it unnecessary in the long run. The U.S. 9th Army set upon the enemy in the Roer district to the south. The Canadian and British divisions were going great guns, though with much loss of blood, through the flat country between the Reichswald and the Rhine. The Boche admitted the plain meaning of the writing on the wall and started to pull back what he could of his depleted forces. He had done well according to his lights, but it was almost his last defensive battle on the grand scale. Early in the morning of March z the Reconnaissance Regiment of the 52nd got a small force across the anti-tank ditch, whence it proceeded to occupy high ground near a brick works. This success was followed up quickly by the 4th K.O.S.B., who completely secured this stubborn bridgehead.

PETER WHITE'S ACCOUNT

Chapter: Operation 'Veritable'

The plan was to carry out a 2-phase attack in conjunction with the 7th/9th Royal Scots, through woods, and over 6 miles of country, with a Company objective of some houses on a crossroads at Siebengewald, next to a large seminary on the Dutch-German border.

In the first phase the Royal Scots were to clear Afferden woods, several miles in extent. We were to follow through, making our way across country via Molenhuis farm on the edge of the wood across an anti-tank ditch, over open fields via a group of houses called Kleine Horst and clearing several small woods, and a village of Kreftenheije, while the Royal Scots took Groote Horst village on our right. Finally, we had a customs house and another small wood to deal with before digging in. Our Platoon objective was the customs house.

In view of subsequent events, and the strength of the enemy, these objectives seemed wildly optimistic, especially as we were in the heart of the Siegfried Line defences. As a cross-country route march with all our kit and no enemy it would, as we were to see, have been physically exhausting.

Meanwhile, word came back that the attack had run into far fiercer resistance than had been bargained for halfway through the wood. This resulted in a hurried fresh set of 'O' Groups, and a drastic change of plan. The new plan was to try to penetrate from the northern to the southern part of Afferden wood (it was in two main blocks) via Kasteel Blijenbeek, a moated castle in the central clearing, then skirt the eastern part of the southern block of woods along an anti-tank ditch, then penetrate to a group of houses called Koepel in this southern wood, and dig in there on high ground ready for any trouble before first light. (pp. 164-165)

Approximate axis of advance

The Ground: Afferden Wood

Our path lay down a gradual slope, revealing the sandy rides with which the woods were split into rectangular blocks of about 500 x 250 yards apiece, each track being 40-60 feet wide. The engineers had cut the rides that were being used as the main axis into two sections divided by mine tape on poles and lit at intervals by coloured, shaded lamps facing back from the enemy one side for use by wheeled, and the other by tracked vehicles. (p. 166) 

At 3 in the morning on 18 February, sand spilling in on top of me as I tried to doze marked the arrival of a runner from Company HQ to call -`O' Group, Mr White Surr!' The enemy had been heavily resisting the 5th KOSB in their advance overnight with strong points and snipers cunningly sited in the dark maze forest sections, and had now been located in determined strength dug in in the vicinity of the Kasteel/Blijenbeek, and on the high ground dominating the space between the two blocks of forest. 

The depth of penetration in the last plan had had to be modified again. A and C companies were to creep from the rim of our block of forest before first light and dig in just short of the anti-tank ditch, which was unexpectedly flooded on the right flank. At 0730 hours a heavy barrage was to come down on the enemy for a full hour before we in B Company, followed at an interval by D Company to leapfrog through, were to attack over 500 to 700 yards of low, open ground crossing the Afferden—Goch road, clearing the enemy from the sandy high ground and dig in there before full light. Churchill tanks and AVREs were to come up with us to bridge the anti-tank ditch with fascines for our crossing.  (pp. 166-167)

Aerial: then/now

Period aerial photo, from 'Mountain and Flood.' 
Modern aerial photo with period features overlaid and with references to events in text.
This relates my numbered photos to location, I stitch #1 together to make a landscape and the golf course to the south of the Kasteel did not exist in 2003.

There were no sounds of fighting ahead now, only the occasional revving of a tank engine or the squeak of its tracks faintly echoing in the wood somewhere behind us. The weight of our wet kit hung oppressively, cutting into our shoulders with the webbing, and we were glad when just before 7.30 word came to halt and dig in, covering an arc of low bogland in which our spades struck water a few inches below the surface. This was the start line for the attack, the Kasteel being in an open space somewhere through the next thin strip of wood on our left front.

We were to dig in in case of enemy retaliation during the barrage. Most of the chaps had got some shallow sort of hole started when from behind came the ominous increasing roar of the discharge of many guns, then swiftly, in rising volume and pitch, the shriek of droves of shells, which we could tell would land short, approximately in our positions. The barrage had started.

Those of us who were lucky enough to have a sand scoop to drop into, even if waterlogged, did so. As happened so often, the officers and NCOs, being engaged in 'O' Groups, had none and so we tried to mould ourselves to ruts in the track. For several minutes, until the guns had been corrected by radio to lift up over the trees by several hundred yards, the sand blossomed and cascaded about us, and trees toppled and splintered to the accompaniment of the most awful noise.

This carelessness on the part of our gunners drew searing, pithy comments from the Jocks to match the acid reek of cordite filling the air about us. Quite a lot of snow, which had not yet thawed, lay around and we could see from several gaping dark craters nearby, still steaming in the cold air, that we had been very fortunate not to have any hit.

The ammunition expended on this barrage must have been phenomenal. The sky overhead pulsated with a solid, continuous, moaning shriek of descending projectiles, while the muffled, vibrant drumming of explosions seemed to quite carpet the enemy positions. This display was to be surpassed by subsequent barrages shortly to follow. No wonder a captured German RSM asked in all seriousness later if he could be allowed to see our `belt-fed 25-pounders'. (pp. 167-168)

Photo 1: Landscape of open ground to north of Kasteel Blijenbeek in which A and C Companies dug in. The position of my photos of trench remains in Afferden Wood is marked. 

Advance to Contact

As the hour of the barrage drew to its close, and we were gathering our thoughts for the coming effort, the roar of powerful engines throbbed into life down a track on our right, and a Weasel carrier followed by three Churchill tanks, each carrying a large fascine of brushwood, came into view. These were to bridge the anti-tank ditch for us. At the same moment Smyg gave us the word in 10 Platoon to move forward after Tommy Gray's platoon, bordering the track towards the open, keeping within cover of the trees.

Churchill tank with fascines (brushwood) being dropped into ditch. (Wikipedia)

So far everything had gone according to plan in the approach. Although the two forward companies had had a very hurried task in getting dug in on their positions overlooking the anti-tank ditch before dawn, they had managed to probe for a few hundred yards with a couple of quick recce patrols. These had established that on the left the bridge was blown and that on the right the land was flooded. It would be the job of these two forward companies to give us covering fire as we attacked. (p. 168) 

I was moving with my Pln HQ on the track rim with about 30 yards to go to the edge of the wood. The head of this track was now luridly lit with towering sheets of petrol-, oil- and rubber-fed flame, darkening the surroundings with the smoke-pall: a heart tearing sight in its implications. The artillery Weasel was blazing furiously about 20 feet away, with ammunition starting to cook off inside. A smoking figure, we supposed the driver, tumbled out of this furnace and staggered to collapse in some bushes. It was not clear whether the rest of the crews of these vehicles had got out, but the crash of the shells cooking off inside the tanks told it was too late anyway. To add to the worries of the forward platoon, whose every effort to advance clear of the wood was driven back by intense machine gun fire and sniping, they and we waiting our turn now realised we would have to forfeit the support of the tanks both in their covering fire and in their bridging the ditch. This inferno of explosion, smoke and flame and the singing pelt of metal in the air induced the commander of the remaining unhit tank beside the Weasel to assess the odds as too heavy. He crashed noisily into reverse and churned frantically back to get out of sight of the German guns, flinging sand over us from his spinning tracks while two of my Jocks jumped clear as the hot-fumed monster ripped past scraping the bank and trees. (p. 170)

Platoon Digging In, Afferden Wood

Meanwhile, as it was impossible under the circumstances to press the attack in its present form, there was the inevitable uncomfortable delay while hurried '0' Groups were held at a higher level, and we crouched waiting. There was no roofing to our foxholes and the shrapnel was a menace, cascading down in a hail of steel when each bomb or shell exploded on touching the trees overhead. Young Smith, my batman, and the other new chaps, though tense, drawn and frightened, were standing the first loss well.

As time went on the tracks splitting the wood were becoming increasingly difficult to cross due to accurate sniping. Lt 'Jock' Beattie trying to cross one fast, tripped and fell, rolling into a tank rut and was accompanied by pursuing bullets. There he was stuck for a long while. He confessed to me later that while trapped there he had overcome with difficulty the idea of holding up an arm or leg to get an easy 'Blighty wound'.

Smyg, back from his 'Orders' Group at Battalion HQ in the next block of woods behind us, revealed that we were all, starting with my Platoon, to dig in over the track; however, I was to cross with him first to carry out a recce for the new Company positions south-west through the wood towards the village of Rempeld.

We both paused at the edge of the track before showing ourselves, to try to sense the rhythm of the snipers' activities, then with that same odd feeling of excitement experienced as a child in evading the haphazard blows of a pillow in 'Blind-man's buff', we both dashed for cover on the far side. The crackle of bullets into the bushes behind us confirmed we had been wise in our caution. A couple of hours later Capt David Colville, trying to get back to report to Battalion HQ, was fatally shot through the head and his sergeant was wounded when they chose the wrong moment for the same crossing; a very sad loss to the Battalion (of Colville's Steel family).

Photo 2: Track due south of Kasteel, remains of trenches on Wood's edge.

Once over, we both moved forward very carefully in case any enemy were still dug in there as we were moving on the extreme right flank of the Battalion area, with a gap between ourselves and the Recce Regt. As we moved we could hear the mortar bombs were pasting Bn HQ a bit back towards the track junction.

We heard later that one of the Alsatian war dogs there had gone quite bomb happy, cowering whimpering in a hole and refusing to come out. We quickly fixed rough layouts in our minds for the Platoon areas and Coy HQ, and were making our way back when we both paused in astonishment to listen, not quite trusting our ears that we were hearing correctly. About 50 yards ahead of us the wood finished on a road that ran along its rim, beyond which lay A Company pinned in full view of the enemy. Along this road from the right we could hear the sounds of an approaching convoy of 3-ton trucks which we knew from their distinctive revving whine were ours.

Whoever they were, they obviously did not realise they were placidly wandering right across the front line lengthwise, and in excellent view of at least two 88mm anti-tank guns and all that the enemy possessed in the way of small arms. That they had got as far as this from Afferden village and through Rempeld village unscathed seemed to be only due to the fact that the enemy must have been even more staggered at the sight than we were.

As Smyg and I crawled forward to peer down from a ridge of high ground in the wood to make out what was going on we heard voices of shouted warning from A Company.

The trucks, five 3-tonners, must either not have heard or not have understood for the drivers continued steadily on in convoy towards the smashed Weasel and burned-out tanks. As the vehicles drew level with us down a slight slope through the trees, the air overhead and in the trees about us crashed deafeningly to the bark of an 88mm gun's missiles and the numerous crackles of small-arms fire. Smyg and I dropped to the sandy pine-carpeted earth and crawled frantically backwards as fast as we could down the reverse slope to get out of line of the pelting hail of metal which cut ricocheting through the trees with an appalling, echoing racket. 

One by one the trucks crunched to a stop with engines still running. The drivers piled out and fled back through the wood past us to the right, crouching and tripping in their desperation to get clear, running like chased rabbits. Within seconds the first three trucks, then the other two, were burning furiously. The reason for their hurried retreat, we soon realised, was not just to get clear of the shooting. Frank had just joined us to see what was afoot when a series of indescribably devastating explosions occurred, each blast being followed by towering 60- to 100-foot sheets of flame and reddish-black smoke leaping and coiling high above the tree-tops. At each fresh explosion — and there seemed no end to them — the flames towered to greater heights. Pieces of the trucks, axles, wheels and bits of engines of all sizes buzzed and sizzled through the air at tremendous speed, then clattered and thudded heavily into the trees over a wide area.

Photo 3: Track on rim of Afferden Wood on which lorries were attacked (looking south-east).

The three of us rushed for some cover more substantial than a tin hat and scrambled panting and puzzled into a German dugout. We could not think what it was the trucks contained to produce so vast and sustained a display of flame and explosion which continued for over half an hour. The answer was supplied later by a sheepish driver, almost unnerved by his experience, who stated that the trucks had been loaded with several tons of 5.5-inch shells and many hundreds of gallons of petrol and oil in jerrycans. These numerous containers instead of all exploding in one go, had cooked off steadily in batches in the increasing heat. We later heard that A Company had nearly been 'cooked' as their wet clothes steamed dry some yards distant. These trucks should have stopped far to the rear, but a military policeman had wrongly directed them. When the worst of the explosions and spinning debris had spent its fury, we scuttled back to the Company to bring them over the track to dig in. The double traversing of the track was accomplished in safety despite the still active snipers who were now also using a machine gun in short bursts. 

Seeing our movements the enemy had obviously passed back information on our new positions to his heavier weapons. As we spread out through the pine woods in section groups to dig in, our self-congratulation at having cheated the snipers was cut short by the depressing whoosh-whoosh of ascending Moaning Minnie rocket projectiles in the distance. (173-175)

Platoon Position: Afferden Wood

My Platoon, with positions laid out to cover all approaches, had just commenced digging in when the enemy, evidently hearing or seeing us through the trees from his hill, gave us as a Company all he had with his mortars. Several of us dived for cover into one of the few holes then available. Ironically, this was an old enemy mortar pit dug near the crest of our Platoon hill in a clearing. Being on the highest spot in that tract of wood was unfortunate. 

Our hearts were going like ticking-over motorcycle engines. One's feelings at these times when apparently closest to a quick but foreseen end in which one could keep track of each sound and visualise the moves made by the enemy mortar crews in the process, seemed to clear one's mind to an intense aliveness and awareness of life. Thoughts raced as though boosted with a supercharger. The knowledge that at any instant this keen appreciation of life — the scent of roots rotting in the damp earth, the sight of Cutter's tense ashen face alongside mine as we watched the sand trickling from the pit side loosed by each concussion and listened to the sigh of the wind in the pine-tops — that this thread and one's thought with it could be suddenly blasted into violent oblivion, seemed to hold a quality of dreamlike unreality about it more persistent even than the awful material evidence the explosives all too often produced. 

It was essential in a wood to provide a slit trench with some sort of roofing stout enough to withstand at least the smaller pieces of shrapnel from above, at the same time leaving one end open as a fire position for the two men who usually shared a trench. Quite a few casualties were needlessly suffered before this lesson was driven home. About 200 yards behind us in the woods were some typical German dugouts constructed of interlocking heavy logs piled over with earth and the inside floored with straw. We made use of these portable materials once it became clear we might be stuck in these positions for some time. (p. 176-178)

Photo 4: Deeper entrenchments I found in Afferden Wood - former German bunkers?

Chapter: Halted in Broederbosch Wood

After 'stand down', I propped my mess tin over three twigs and a pile of Hexamine tablets on the rim of my hole, feeling stiff, heavy eyed and thick headed, and cooked up some Spam and tea to eat with some biscuits for breakfast. It was a crisp, cold morning and steam was soon wisping off the hot mess of the Compo tea mixture in which chips of Spam floated in the unrinsed mess-tin. Everyone once again looked worn, red eyed, greyish in the face with dirt and tiredness, and with quite a growth of beard. It was not much use attempting a shave or wash until we could get more than our precious pint or two a day of tea water. (p. 182)

The Germans, I thought, must have knocked off for breakfast. The side of a ration box lay next to me. I had some chalks handy, so I took the opportunity of doing a sketch with which to decorate my hole. It took the form of an inn sign on which was pictured a pair of boots belonging to someone taking a header into a slit trench. Underneath was the legend: 'YE OLDE HEADER INN, Proprietor: I.B. WELL-UNDER'. This seemed to provide the Jocks with infinite mirth and the laughter helped put things in perspective again. 

'Morning cuppa. Platoon HQ in Afferden Wood'
Photo 5: Trench remains, Afferden Wood: the site of 'Ye Olde Header Inn'?

A little later the sound of aircraft engines overhead drew our eyes to follow the shapes of four of our Typhoons wheeling high over the Kasteel Blijenbeek like a group of vultures checking on their prey. One after the other they slipped swiftly sideways and down, the note of their engines roaring harshly up the scale with increasing volume. Already the first at full throttle seemed to be plummeting straight to destruction in the woods when a sudden formation of white wisps of smoke streaked forward of the plane, then a whoosh of discharge of these rockets reached us. At the same moment while the plane seemed almost into the trees, black streamers of smoke filmed back from the leading edge of the wings. We thought, with a catch in our throats, that he had been hit, as he vanished from sight among the tree tops. Instantly there was a tremendous blast of explosion. For an awful split second it seemed this was the sound of the plane gone straight into the earth, but instantly it reappeared, banking steeply, and soared fast out of small-arms range, making way for the next one shrieking down into the pall of reddish dust and smoke rising up from the Kasteel. The clatter of cannon fire explained the black smoke. Several times they came again in sets of four to repeat their fascinating performance. They were a great morale raiser and a delight to the Jocks to watch, each one being greeted with a cheer echoing through the woods as it came and cries of unprintable approval. I took the opportunity of drawing my impression of the attack on a sheet of notepaper as the planes dived down. (p. 183)

'Sketched from my slit trench as the Typhoons were still at it.'

Patrol from Afferden Wood

The next text describes a patrol into the ground that lay between Afferden Wood and the flooded anti-tank ditch. Given the similarity in landscape between 1945 and 2003 (year of my visit) I can reasonably guess that this ground is what is now the farmland north of the Goch-Afferden road and the wood's edge.

Before leaving I held a section commanders 'O' Group to tell them what was afoot, and to arrange a password for our return. I handed the Platoon over to Sgt Dickinson in case we did not get back, and taking my revolver and two Stens with lots of ammunition, we set off. I decided not to clutter ourselves with grenades, as at our strength we wanted to avoid, rather than seek, trouble.

The ground ahead was about 500 yards of sandy soil planted with pine seedlings, then some rougher ground and pasture towards the silver streak where the flooded ditch was. Behind that rose the dark, clear shape of the hill and woods held by the enemy. Waiting for a cloud to cover the bright moonlight, we crept one after the other over the parapet and down a slight slope towards scattered, stunted young seedlings, crouching as we went to present as small an object against the sky as possible to anyone on the ground ahead. Every few yards I paused, and the other two shunted to a halt behind me. In the silence we peered, listening intently, each with an arc to cover. I looked ahead and Brown to the left, McKenzie to the right. (p. 185)

Photo 6: German held high ground, to west of Kasteel; photo looking west, Goch-Afferden road, farmland and Afferden Wood visible at distant right.

Photo 7: Same ridge behind Kasteel, look east.

FOO Trench on Wood's Edge

During the following day I took a section to dig a concealed position right on the very rim of the wood, giving a good view of the enemy frontage opposite. This was to provide cover for the FOO, or Forward (Artillery) Observation Officer, and his assistant. From there he kept watch all day and sometimes in the evening for signs of enemy movement so that he could direct the guns onto it via his 18 set radio and later a field telephone. It took a long time to dig and camouflage these positions, as we had been ordered to do it in daylight. To start with the chaps dug lying on their sides till the hole was deep enough to stand in. We supplied the FOO with a section of Jocks dug in covering him from behind. (p. 189)

'The Position we dug for the F.O.O. Artillery chaps on the rim of the wood.'

Photo 8: Taken on edge of Afferden Wood looking south towards the Kasteel (distant centre).

Withdrawal

B Company, 4 KOSB handed over their forward positions to the 6 HLI about 23 February. Two days later, the weary Battalion withdrew 2 miles to the rear into Brigade reserve.

An excellent video that gives an overview of the Kasteel and surrounding ground: ©2016 Kasteel Bleijenbeek Afferden LB on Vimeo

HISTORY OF BLEIJENBEEK CASTLE/KASTEEL BLEIJENBEEK

KOSB attack on Kasteel Bleijenbeek

The crackle of passing bullets whenever anyone attempted to cross the track alongside us told that this was dominated by a concealed set of snipers ahead. It was now established that the Germans, well dug in on the high scrubland, overlooked and dominated our position with heavy fire power, and in the fortified Kasteel Blijenbeek, a prepared area of their choosing, meant to stand and fight it out. Already two attacks on the Kasteel by C Company had been repulsed with casualties. They alone lost more than forty men during the day. In the first attack a Platoon under Sgt Welsh using the mist as camouflage crossed a bridge, the only way in to the courtyard of the Kasteel, just as it was becoming light. The enemy did not show a sign of their presence until half the Platoon were inside, at which the main doors swung back, and the Jerries opened fire with all they had at 10 yards range, hitting seven men, three fatally. With amazing presence of mind, and good fortune Sgt Welsh managed to withdraw the others swiftly into the mist, leaving the wounded. A short while later he volunteered to try to contact A Company on the right, but in the attempt was fatally wounded by a sniper who shot him in the head. Though he was evacuated to the UK within about 24 hours, he died soon afterwards.

Meanwhile, Capt Hill MC, the MO, together with Pte McBeth MM insisted on going to the Kasteel to attend to the wounded. At a later period, arms were issued to the Doc as personal protection as the enemy showed so little respect for the red-cross flag, but on this occasion they were unarmed but for flags and arm bands, and in spite of being fired on, disappeared into the Kasteel. After half an hour, he strolled back with McBeth, bringing a wounded chap with them. He said while he lit his pipe, that he had had an interesting talk with the German MO while there. (p. 172) 

The castle was still in a state of disrepair when I visited in 2003. From the account below, I understand that it had been swept for ordnance and the structure stabilised, however, the grounds were overgrown and the building was open to the elements. Overall, it looked like the ruins of a once grand building that had suffered significant wartime damage and never repaired. I note the recent conservation efforts at the site and it is looking in a very different condition. Also, since my 2003 battlefield walk, the area to the south and south west of the Kasteel, on the heath behind the then German held ridge, a golf course has been constructed with several water features. There is a YouTube video (in Dutch) detailing the restoration work.


Kasteel Liberation Route © Gemeente Bergen

Kasteel Liberation Route © Gemeente Bergen

Kasteel Bleijenbeek, March 2003.

Kasteel Bleijenbeek, March 2003.

Kasteel Bleijenbeek, Present day (Traces of History).

Kasteel Bleijenbeek, Present day (Traces of History).

Castle Origins

On 21/22 February 1945, Bleijenbeek Castle was destroyed by bombs from the RAF. Little has happened after the bombardment of the site within the moat. The ruins have been neglected for more than 60 years.

In December 2009, the Bleijenbeek Castle Ruin Foundation was founded, which acquired the leasehold right over the site from the owner ASR for fifty years.

Around 1990 ASR bought the estate of more than 600 hectares from a family foundation, founded by the previous owner, Rudolf Jurgens from Nijmegen. He had bought the estate in the early 1930s from his friend Lothar Reichsgraf von und zu Hoensbroeck. That family became the owner of Bleijenbeek Castle around 1600 after the death of the most famous inhabitant of the castle, Maarten Schenck van Nijdeggen, also known for his castle at Lobith on the Rhine, the Schenckenschans. The Van Hoensbroucks lived there until 1850. After 1850 it served as a monastery, first of nuns, then of Jesuits, expelled from Germany by Bismarck's Kulturkampf.

Maarten Schenck was a 'condottiere', an army superior with his own cavalry who fought during the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) on the side of everyone who recognized his right to Bleijenbeek. First it was the Spaniards, then the States-General. At that time Bleijenbeek (Bliënbeck) was the northernmost castle in the Overkwartier of Gelre. The area did not enter Dutch hands until after 1815, and was added to the province of Limburg.

Bleijenbeek Castle is to be created at the end of the 14th century, when the castle in Afferden, lying on the Meuse, was destroyed. Probably partly because of the water of the Meuse. That place is still called 's Heerenwaard. The castle was moved about two kilometres to the east, on the road to Goch. Behind them were fens and marshes, bisected by the Gochsedijk on which Bleijenbeek is located. The castle therefore controlled the only route along the right Bank of the Meuse, between the castle and the Meuse.

The shape of the castle, when it was destroyed, was largely as it was around 1700. In 1704 the tower was built, in the inner course. The Jesuits built another large chapel on the west side, which has been demolished again. In the archives of Schloss Haag the leases of the farms on the estate have been kept since about 1600. This shows that the possessions stretched over a large area, from Heijen to Well. The Maasduinen, in which the area is located, were largely heathland, only after 1945 mainly planted with forest.

Recent History

After February 1945, the ruins were desolate. The whole of Afferden was in ruins, so, understandably, people liked to remove stones from the front house in particular (which was only from 1911, so no old bricks). Neighbour Roovers of Castle Heijen also came later, with permission, to get old stones to repair the damage on Heijen.

There was some compensation for war damage, but it was entirely spent on the reconstruction of the tenancy farms. The castle ruins were seen as hopeless. Due to fire, everything had collapsed to the roof of the basement, insofar as non-direct hits – especially on the east side – had destroyed everything. What would have been the point, at that time of the restoration of the hard-hit Netherlands, of restoration of such a badly destroyed castle in a secluded place.

There was a search for bombs and grenades by the explosives disposal service, and a lot was removed. In the early 1970s, the entire outer canal was also carefully dredged, with many explosives also found. After that, the canal temporarily became a kind of pond for a fishing association.

That's how the remains went. Overgrowth by plants and trees (very romantic!) and use of the terrain to grow corn on it as pheasant food. When ploughing by Harrie de Best, one of the rangers, the team continued to hook on a piece of metal, years later...a bomb that had come up through ploughing. Fortunately, it ended well.

Around the tower a reinforcing band of wood and iron was built, because it threatened to collapse. Once a year, the Afferdenaren held a "Roofridderfeest" on the premises. This although of course there have never been predators living on the castle: around 1400 - when the construction of Blijenbeek began - they no longer existed, those knights.

Rudolf J. Jurgens (born 1875), the castle lord since 1937, did not want the estate to be split among his heirs after his death. In 1947 he transferred it to a private foundation of the Jurgens family, the Hollyden Foundation, named after his villa in Nijmegen. He became chairman of the board. He died in 1954. His son, Rudolf G. Jurgens in Wassenaar (born 1903) succeeded him as chairman of the foundation. His attention was focused on the management of the 625 ha estate. The ruin received little attention.

When Rudolf G. died in 1987, his son Wilfried Jurgens (born 1931), together with his cousin Leon Velge, was commissioned to sell the estate. In 1994, the Real Estate Department of the Life Insurance Company took over the estate.

(http://kasteelbleijenbeek.nl/historie/ via Google Translate)

 4 KOSB Casualties

Fatalities suffered by 4th Battalion The King's Own Scottish Borderers in February 1945.




The Battle for Haus Loo: 9th March 1945

Lieutenant Peter White details the attack on Haus Loo by 4th Bn KOSB on pages 223-248 of 'With the Jocks'. The objective was located 2km NNE of the town of Alpon and this attack by the 52nd (Lowland) Division came at the end of Operation VERITABLE. The Germans blew the last bridges over the Rhine at Wesel on the morning of 10 March 1945.

Haus Loo was a moated fortified house, no longer in existence. A description of the site is taken from this German website:

In the Middle Ages there was a hunting lodge of the Dukes of Kleve in the damp lowlands of a former arm of the Rhine, mentioned for the first time in the 11th Century. The castle, which was inhabited until the beginning of the 19th Century, had a double wall and moat, was demolished in the 19th Century and was used to rebuild the farm buildings of today's Haus Loo. On the site of the former outer bailey, Haus Loo was built in 1837 as a classicist country residence, typical of landed nobility in Prussia in the 19th Century. (https://www.haus-loo.de/haus-loo)

North West Europe

Sector of battle (A: Alpen B: Haus Loo)


GSGS series 4414. Sheet 4405, Third Edition (AEF). Copied from German Topographische Karte 1:25,000 Sheet 4405 dated 1936 and photolithographed by the British Ordnance Survey in 1944. Lambert modified conical orthomorphic projection. Nord de Guerre Grid.

Modern Topographic L4504 Moers, 1:50,000



I visited the site of the battle in Spring 2003. Peter White provided quite detailed descriptions of his journeys as well as accurate place names. As the Platoon commander attending Orders Groups ('O Groups') where the plans of attack were briefed in detail, I expected he would have an accurate recollection of his movements. Further, as he himself noted, he kept an illicit diary during the war and this was subsequently written up - with memories still fresh, whilst based with the 1st Battalion in Egypt, awaiting his demobilisation. He may also have retained items such as Orders or maps.

My retracing of what I took to believe his approach route is based on his verbal description, the one illustration he did, and my appreciation of the ground. A soldier for 7 years, I put myself in his position of how would I have described his journey. Over and above those considerations, I have noted a few landmarks. First and best, the objective of Haus Loo; the moated island is unique and exactly as described. Second, the crossroads of the track and railway as depicted in the sketch. Third, I have assumed that Peter White's advance started approximately where I started my own journey at the top of the prominent escarpment. It is similar to the description: the farm buildings, possible pub and a bridge across a watercourse is approximate to his description. An advance started further south would have put the KOSB effectively across the boundary to the 7th Bn The Cameronians, advancing on the northern edge of the town of Alpon. Conversely, a start further north would have left a large gap between the 7th Cameronians and Peter White's battalion. Notwithstanding, please note that there is a possibility some of my route may be incorrect.

Here, in two maps, is the line of advance I believe Peter White took with B Coy, 4th KOSB at the Battle of Haus Loo.

The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) Vol 3, 1933-46, p. 213.

GSGS series 4414. Sheet 4405, Third Edition (AEF).

My own route, black dotted line.

I think the route Peter White is best described in his own words; the text below is copyright 'With The Jocks' by Peter White, Sutton Publishing (2001). The page references are from the 2002 paperback version.


Photo Orientation




Background

Our objective was now to be the moated farm of Haus Loo. In our initial briefing before leaving Issum we were to have started the attack from the Xanten-Alpen railway line, clear Haus Loo, then, curving round in an arc from the left, clear some houses, first on the left, then some more on the right, check for enemy in a small wood, then dig in on the cross-roads at Bonning. p.229.

 We were to move off to the start line for the attack at 0445 hours the next morning, 9 March, crossing the Alpen road to a ridge overlooking the railway line which we would have to cross 1,500 yards away over open country, with the farm, our objective, about 700 yards beyond that. p.230.

Groups of laden, push-cart tugging and dejected figures, clutching and comforting babies and children, walked out of the mist ahead – civilian refugees from the first objectives shelling in the valley below. We halted by a wayside heather patch. This was the start line. The first luminosity of the sky and a cold wisp of breeze swirling the mist foretold the dawn. The wonder and magic of the dawn’s beauty, always exciting, somehow seemed more beautiful than ever, with the grouped silhouettes of the Jocks against it and the poignant realisation that for many of us it would be our last. Each moment seemed of sufficient value to drink in with all one’s senses, even down to the pathetic, chirping attempt at a dawn chorus by a few explosive-stunned birds. p. 231.

Photo 1: View across field looking south-east, probably area where troops dug in before setting off. Was this the 'heather patch'?
 
Medium tanks appeared on the hill behind us and several roared down along the skyline, then raced back up again. This puzzled us a bit at first, and with Frank I made my way forward under cover of some trees to get a better look at what was going on down in the valley. p.232.


Photo 2: Edge of escarpment Could this be where the Medium tanks drove to draw the 88mm fire from their comrades below?

We could just make out the sprinkled figures of our two forward companies, tiny specks advancing slowly in line towards the railway embankment, halfway to Haus Loo. Dirty black splodges of smoke blossomed among them and drifted off over the fields. Several of the figures lay still behind the advancing line. Just then the 88mm anti-tank guns opened up heavily, sending their stray shots ricocheting with a most frightening sound into the bank and over our heads. They were after the tanks advancing with the Jocks below, and I then realised that the odd activities of the cruiser tanks on the skyline had been a brave effort to distract these guns in drawing their fire from the advancing Shermans. p.232.

The Advance

At last word came for us to move, 10 Platoon leading, followed by Advance Company HQ Rear. On our immediate left were the Guards [Guards Armoured Division], then the Canadians, and on our right Cameronians, the Royal Scots and in the distance the Americans, all piling in to the ‘Wesel Pocket’. p.233.


Photo 3: The escarpment where Peter White and Capt Frank Coutts (2ic B Company, obituary)
 crept over to view the advance of A and D Coys below. I presume that the hillside was the bank into which the stray shots impacted.

We scrambled down a steep, wooded hill to a mud track, making for a bridge to cross a water obstacle after passing a farm in which we spotted a few German civilians pottering about the yard. By the bridge was a large cream-coloured building which seemed both a pub and a farm to look at, in which the regimental aid post had been set up. At the roadside by a newly laid tank bridge, a white-faced casualty sat, while another blood-streaked, bandage-draped figure staggered with a limp back from the front as we trudged forwards, alert, tense and watchful. p.233.

Photo 4: View looking back to previous shot location. The text mentions a 'cream-coloured building' both a 'pub and a farm' that was located 'by the bridge' where the Regimental Aid Post was located. The nearest building in the photo, on right hand side, could be this structure. It is about 50 yards away from the bridge over the culvert (likely watercourse over which was the 'newly laid tank bridge'). There was no evidence of another structure and the 1944 map, above, does not show a building immediately next to the watercourse.

My Platoon squeaked and clattered their way over and through a fence, Smyg just behind, with the Company spread out in arrowhead formation. Frank was somewhere out on the right. As the distance to the railway embankment narrowed, so the mortaring increased in its intensity. Some way ahead we could now make out the numerous scattered forms of A Company laying in and beside the shallow mortar craters.

Our thoughts were interrupted here by a new factor – some very loud whiplash cracks from a sniper firing at us from the right.

Smyg called me over to where he crouched in the stubble with Maj Stewart, and told me to take my chaps on up to the railway embankment and dig in there. Being the only one on my feet during this time, getting to and from Smyg was decidedly unhealthy, as the sniper gave me individual attention materialising in a series of deafening cracks from bullets passing near my head. p.234

Photo 5: Looking in the direction of the objective, Haus Loo, in distance to the North East. These are likely to be the fields in which B Company went to ground. It is exposed and the sniper fire was from the outskirts of Alpon, to the right hand side of the photo.


I was astonished to see from my watch that although the attack had started at eight that morning, it was already midday! Where on earth had the time gone to? I had just started digging in when a call came for me to go to an ‘O’ Group along the embankment to where Alan, Maj Stewart and several others were congregated in aa ground-hugging cluster beside a railway gangers’ small concrete hut. The bank was just tall enough to afford protection from machine gun fire from the other side of it if one adopted a shuffling, half-crawling stoop. p.235.

Photo 6: The view South East looking towards the railway embankment. Looking towards where Smyg and Company HQ was located. No gangers' hut remaining.

Our right flank was exposed because some factory buildings out there which were supposed to have been taken by the Cameronians had been establish as one of the sources of the sniper and machine gun fire. p. 235

Smyg asked me to take my Platoon over the embankment immediately and work our way over to the left against it, then lie there until the other platoons were in position for the attack to go in.

I formed the Platoon up on the near side of the railway embankment and after a lot of vocal effort, they followed me over well in one wave. As we skipped across the metals of the tracks, the crackle and hum of snipers’ bullets and machine gun fire spattered about exactly like a shower of hail. p.235-36.

The factory, source of MG and sniper fire, was the Lemken works approx. 300 yds South East of Peter White's position on the railway embankment. It was not cleared by the 6th Cameronians until late on 9th March.

Period view of the Lemken works, believed to manufacture agricultural machinery.

This is an illustration made by Peter White, showing an overvirew of the ground look North East from the railway embankment towards Haus Loo (top right corner). His note in the centre of the sketch highlights his position on the ground, reading 'Platoon HQ pinned down'.

Photo 7: To the best of my ability I climbed the larger tree in Photo 6 to capture the same view in Peter White's illustration. His perspective is impossible but a few key features stand out: the railway, the laneway on the left, the field boundary in centre mid-ground, and Haus Loo, distant.
Photo 8: View at top of railway embankment looking directly towards Haus Loo. Peter White's Platoon went over the railway here and then made their way to photo left.

The sniping was now heavy, sustained and accurate. Behind us the bank absorbed the numerous missiles with a loud, heavy thumping which came simultaneously to the sharp crackle of their passage through the air, and we were dismayed to find as we dashed and crawled the 150 yards to the left to get to the attack position that there was next to no cover at all.

Jerry, seeing us scuttling along, realised another attack was forming up, and gave us all he had. p. 236.

A cart track feathered with a few trees led from the farm objective to the railway line over which it crossed on our immediate left. The enemy had obviously registered this junction of the railway and the track as a defence fire task for his mortars and artillery. We were increasingly subjected, to mortaring especially, on a scale never previously met even at Heinsberg and which was never subsequently surpassed. p. 236.

Photo 9: Crossed over the railway and looking towards the lane/rail junction. The cart track runs L to R, and the area in the foreground was where Platoon HQ went to ground.
Photo 10: Looking South East from Peter White's position towards the ground from which the Platoon came: the '150 yards that was dashed and crawled'. Good appreciation of how exposed the KOSB's advance was to the fire from the factory on the skyline.
 
A series of violent bangs just behind and the revving of tank engines informed us that several Shermans were firing from a hull-down position on the far side of the railway bank. This was unfortunate as it brought immediate, accurate and heavy 88mm anti-tank fire from a concealed enemy gun in the woods bordering Haus Loo. Pte Jones, the parachutist, was crawling towards a culvert 10 yards away to have a look through when a black flash enveloped it and hid him from view. Another, a solid shot, fell short at immense velocity ploughing into the earth ahead, stretching the whole surface of the ground on which we lay and, to our amazement, such was the force of the impact that the earth heaved sluggishly like jelly to and fro. p. 237-38.

A line of mortar bombs fell heavily ahead and we moved on through the smoke still twirling and eddying as it blew back past us. How queer the seeming chances of their fall, and the thoughts that flitted through my mind. A surer hand than chance seemed to be guiding us, for had we moved off 30 seconds earlier the bombs would have coincided exactly with our stooping line of figures, hopping round craters and plodding forwards. p.240


Photo 11: I took this shot kneeling where the Platoon HQ was sheltering, Haus Loo distant centre. This would have been the ground into which the 88mm solid shot landed. The Very signal to advance was to have been fired right to left across the Platoon's front.

We could see the trees and high ground of Haus Loo looming through the smoke of explosives hanging in a through-drying fog above the grass. The low-lying ground was in part flooded. In this water and on the grass we were astonished and saddened to recognise the bodies of several of the chaps from the resto of the Company. More puzzled than ever we got through the water and climbed the sandy, wooded bank, which was seemingly deserted, working round to the right for more cover and at the same time realising that in some queer way the attack had gone in without the red Verey signals, and in consequence without us. In view of this I had reluctantly accepted the conclusion that both Smyg and Frank must have become casualties. p.241


Photo 13: On the objective: the embankment behind which the former moated castle of Haus Loo was situated.

Photo 14: Looking slight left of previous photo, cart track at left hand side.

Photo 15: Close up of the ground on the embankment, riddled with shrapnel and spent rounds to this day.

A dead German lay near the crest, and ahead the ground dropped away to a waterfilled moat surround an island, with a glimpse of the farm beyond. p.241

Photo 16: Looking South, top of embankment.

My chaps joined the rest of the Company in digging in as fast as they could in the explosives-tasting evening mist. They were just about dead beat. It was only the continuing fall of enemy projectiles round Haus Loo which prompted this additional burst of energy, for the day, which had started very early, had been a singularly demanding one. p.242.

Photo 17: Looking back towards Haus Loo, from the track leading to the main Alpon road. 

Photo 18: Same position as photo 16, but looking towards the main Alpon road, the trees running across the skyline.




Photo 19: Looking toward Alpon and the Factory.


Photo 20: Similar view to photo 19, looking toward Alpon and the Factory.

Guards Armoured Division Accounts

Units of the Guards Armoured Division (32 Guards Brigade) were in action both prior to Peter White's battalion assault on Haus Loo and during the battle. On 8th March, 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards (2 SG) advanced from from the Bonninghardt high ground (down the gully I believe P.W. advanced) and their objective was to push the Germans back to the railway embankment (where P.W. took shelter). Their task included securing the Start Line for 4 KOSB and the armoured 5th Battalion Coldstream Guards (5 CG) for the attack the following day, 9th March.

The Scots Guards account sheds light on the start of Peter White's journey. Specifically, it names the watercourse over which he advanced as the River Romer. Further, the account identifies the bridge over the Romer which was to be secured by 2 SG to enable their advance. The bridge was nicknamed 'Nigel' after SG Capt N.H Barne MC, who led the reconnaissance patrol that identified the structure as intact. Further, the SG account also details that the bridge collapsed on 8th March ("Nigel is crumbling") - which would correlate to Peter White's account of seeing a "newly laid tank bridge" over the feature.

Overlays of 2 SG positions on 8th March and 5 CG and 4 KOSB advances on 9th March.

Account of 2 SG from 'Scots Guards 1919-1955' by David Erskine, pp.417-19.



Account of 5 CG from 'Second to None: The History of the Coldstream Guards, 1650-2000, pp. 357-59.








Auction of Peter White's Effects

  I have just found a couple of pages I clipped out of The Scotsman in May 2007. It details the story of Peter White, his diary and artwork,...